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Abstract 
 
The 2008 Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced a new business 
rescue regime into South African company law, bringing it into 
line with trends in developed countries, particularly the United 
States. Indeed, it appears that the United States Chapter 11 
model was followed in this process, introducing the business 
rescue concept as a legal transplant. Corporate law is well suited 
to legislative borrowing, but there are important caveats to bear 
in mind when doing so. In particular: the context and legal culture 
of the country of origin may differ from those of the destination 
country. South Africa's commercial environment is different from 
that of the United States, problematising a transplant of Chapter 
11's concepts. Post-commencement finance will be used as a 
micro-study of this broader phenomenon, and this topic will be 
investigated with comparative reference to the position in the 
United States. It will be argued that an essential difference 
between the two procedures is the lack of legislatively mandated 
court oversight in South Africa. This impacts on the interests of 
creditors, as well as on the availability of fresh finance. This 
results in problems in the implementation of the post-
commencement finance provisions, which threaten the viability 
of this particular legal transplant. 
Keywords 
Company law; business rescue; post-commencement finance; 
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1 Introduction 
"The law, it seems, is an eager and experienced traveler",1 and in the case 
of Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act2 ("the Act" or "the South 
African Act") it would appear that United States bankruptcy law has made 
its way to our shores. Academics and practitioners are by now familiar with 
this chapter of the Act, which deals with business rescue.3 
Business rescue, or corporate reorganisation, has become a common 
phenomenon in developed jurisdictions.4 It would appear that the benefits 
of this type of approach seem to be generally viewed as outweighing the 
drawbacks.5 Chapter 6 of the Act sought to update South African company 
law in line with developments in other countries.6 The purpose section of 
the Act7 reiterates aims set out in the 2004 policy paper prepared by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and entitled "South African 
Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform".8 
This policy paper emphasised an intention to develop a business rescue 
regime appropriate to the needs of the current South African economy and 
                                            
*  Helena Stoop LLB (Pret) LLM (Stell). Senior Lecturer in the Department of Commercial 
Law, University of Cape Town, South Africa; PhD candidate, Durham Law School, 
United Kingdom. Email helena.stoop@uct.ac.za.  
**  Andrew Hutchison BA LLB LLM PhD (UCT). Associate Professor in the Department 
of Commercial Law, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email 
andrew.hutchison@uct.ac.za. 
1  Markovits 2005 Cornell Int'l LJ 95. 
2  Companies Act 71 of 2008 ("the Act"). 
3  For general discussions of the provisions of ch 6, see Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law ch 18; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 375-408; Bradstreet 2011 SALJ 
352-380; Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ 435-457. 
4  See for example Emmerman 2015 Am Bankr Inst J 26-28; Metzger and Bufford 1993 
Cal Bankr J 153-159; Wessels 2014 Insolvency Intelligence 4-9.  
5  The rationale for this type of approach is that the greater good of the enterprise as a 
whole should take precedence over an individual creditor's interests. The liquidation 
of a major corporation will result in job losses, which may have a negative impact on 
the economic status of a geographical location if a city depends on the resident 
corporation. Also there will be losses to shareholders. Thus business rescue, if 
successful, is certainly in the public interest. Even creditors may benefit, since the 
value of a business's assets is usually greater if it remains a going concern – or even 
if it is sold as a going concern – than if it is liquidated and its assets sold off piecemeal. 
For a defence of business rescue as a concept, see McCormack Corporate Rescue 
Law ch 1. For a contrary view, see Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ 435-457, who points out 
that it should not be accepted without question that liquidation proceedings necessarily 
produce less favourable outcomes. 
6  See the discussion in Rajak and Henning 1999 SALJ 263-264. 
7  One of the express purposes of the new Companies Act at s 7(k) is to "provide for the 
efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that 
balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders". 
8  GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004. 
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mentions specifically that the United States model found in Chapter 11 of 
that country's Bankruptcy Code9 would be considered.10 
It is also not surprising that the legislature chose to consult United States 
law and to consider incorporating (at least in part) the Chapter 11 process. 
As Loubser11 points out, Chapter 11 reorganisation has "reached cult 
status", with an overwhelming number of jurisdictions in Europe and 
elsewhere choosing to consider, rely on, and incorporate its processes and 
provisions. The prevailing school of thought seems to be that the success 
of this mechanism in the United States endorses its value as a legal 
transplant.12 
Given this, and the relative maturity of the United States corporate rescue 
regime, one would be forgiven for considering this regime a valuable source 
of insight that our courts might draw on for guidance when interpreting the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of the Act. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers13 was unwilling to do so for a number of reasons. This article 
will not analyse the substance of the decision in the Kariba case, but instead 
considers the court's reluctance to look to the United States' Chapter 11 and 
the jurisprudence thereunder when interpreting the provisions of the South 
African Act's Chapter 6. The Supreme Court of Appeal did not, however, 
conclude that as a general rule American jurisprudence should not be 
considered, but merely that it was inappropriate to do so in the instance 
before it.14 We contend that this might well also be the case for several other 
provisions of Chapter 6. Although the Act expressly provides that courts 
may look to foreign company law to inform their decisions to the extent that 
this is appropriate,15 close analysis shows that they should proceed with 
caution in the case of Chapter 11 of the United States code. This paper will 
defend this view by means of a comparative analysis of the United States 
and South African positions on post-commencement financing. 
                                            
9  Chapter 11 was introduced into US corporate insolvency law by the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, 1978. The United States federal law on bankruptcy may be found in Title 
11 "Bankruptcy" of the United States Code (hereafter "the Bankruptcy Code"). 
10  GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004 45. 
11  Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ 439. 
12  Loubser 2013 SA Merc LJ 440. More extensive discussion of legal transplantation 
follows in part 4.2 below. 
13  African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 2015 5 
SA 192 (SCA) (hereafter Kariba). 
14  Kariba para 16. 
15  Section 5(2) of the Act. 
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This paper will not purport to consider the merits of Chapter 11 as a legal 
transplant in South Africa, however. A subtle yet pervasive import of the 
features of this system is a fait accompli. Instead, now that Chapter 11 has 
been incorporated into South African company law, the paper will question 
whether a similar positive impact of the business rescue concept is possible 
in South Africa under the existing statutory provisions of Chapter 6 of the 
Act. Primarily, the paper will caution against a process of statutory 
interpretation that imports features of United States law without careful 
consideration of the significant differences between the Act and Chapter 11. 
In considering the case of post-commencement finance it becomes clear 
that judges may be confined and restricted by the wording of the Act in a 
manner that no interpretation can remedy, regardless of how progressive or 
robust it may be. Indeed, attempts to fill the gaps by importing from United 
States law could cause as much damage to the reputation of Chapter 6's 
provision as a conservative, textual approach.16 
Part Two of the article will provide an overview of the relevant provisions of 
Chapter 11 of the United States Code and describe recent developments in 
the United States that are relevant to the discussion. Following this, in Part 
3, the post-commencement financing provisions of the South African Act will 
be discussed and analysed in the light of cases that have considered these 
sections. In Part Four the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Kariba will serve as a point of departure to comment briefly on the debate 
surrounding so-called legal transplants and how these manifest in the 
context of corporate law in general and specifically in the context of 
insolvency law and post-commencement finance during business rescue 
proceedings. The comparative analysis illustrates that a greater degree of 
oversight by the courts, perhaps unexpectedly, renders the United States 
system flexible and practical, as will be argued in the conclusion in Part Five. 
2 Post-petition finance in the United States 
2.1 Chapter 11 reorganisation in general 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978; hence the 
comment by LoPucki and Triantis that it is a "mature" system.17 Chapter 11 
                                            
16  See for example Osode 2015 Penn State J L Int'l Affairs 459, where the author argues 
that "the adoption of an interpretive approach that is conservative, largely textual or 
literal, and purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of Chapter Six 
achieving the public policy goals intended by law and policymakers. Indeed, such an 
approach may by itself lead to regulatory failure". 
17  LoPucki and Triantis "Systems Approach" 120. 
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proceedings usually commence with the filing of a petition by the distressed 
company with the bankruptcy court.18 Once such proceedings begin, a 
moratorium ("automatic stay") is placed on litigation and executions against 
the petitioning company.19 The company is then able to meet with creditors 
and shareholders to reorganise debt and restructure the company if 
necessary.20 Reorganisation proceedings under Chapter 11 are referred to 
as "debtor in possession" ("DIP"), with the management structures of the 
company remaining in place, but with the same functions and duties as a 
trustee in conventional bankruptcy proceedings.21 The DIP must then draw 
up a reorganisation plan, which is to be approved by creditors.22 There is 
provision for a "cram down" of dissenting creditors, provided a sufficient 
majority is in favour thereof.23 A cram down occurs when a court orders that 
a business rescue plan should be implemented, despite the objection of a 
dissenting class of creditors. 
2.2 Post-petition finance under Chapter 11 
One of the administrative powers of the DIP is to obtain post-petition finance 
to revitalise the debtor corporation.24 The terms on which such finance can 
be obtained are set out in section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. This section 
establishes four progressive tiers of financing, which create greater and 
greater encumbrances on the assets of the company in favour of the new 
lender. The idea is that the company attempts to obtain finance at the lowest 
level of encumbrance possible, so that if finance can be secured on easier 
terms within the mechanism of say section 364(a) or (b), there is no need 
to look to the protections which section 364(c) or (d) offer to the creditor. 
These tiers will be considered one by one. 
Section 364(a) authorises the company to obtain unsecured credit in the 
ordinary course of business without court approval. This finance will enjoy 
the priority of an administrative expense and will thus rank above unsecured 
                                            
18  This would occur in terms of s 301 of the Bankruptcy Code. See McCormack 
Corporate Rescue Law 78-79. 
19  Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
20  Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
21  Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Armour, Cheffins and Skeel 2002 Vand 
L Rev 1699 for a comparative analysis of US and UK law on corporate reorganisations 
from a corporate governance point of view. 
22  Sections 1121-1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
23  Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. For more detailed analysis of US-style "cram 
downs" see Friedman 1992-1993 Cardozo L Rev; LoPucki and Triantis "Systems 
Approach" 160-170; Broude 1983-1984 Business Lawyer 441-454. 
24  Section 364 read with s 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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creditors with a priority claim on the assets of the company.25 This means 
that the DIP may use funds to pay new creditors during reorganisation, since 
it is authorised to use the company's assets to meet administrative 
expenses.26 All pre-petition secured creditors are in the meantime blocked 
by the automatic stay.27 The "ordinary course of business" requirement is 
open to some interpretation: Henoch suggests a fairly literal interpretation 
of what is considered usual in a business's day-to-day operations.28 This 
would exclude servicing debt or purchasing new capital assets.29 
Section 364(b) authorises the obtaining of unsecured credit with 
administrative expense priority for uses other than in the ordinary course of 
business, provided there is "notice and a hearing". This requires the existing 
creditors to be informed of the pending application and for the new finance 
to be court-approved. This is unlikely to be the favoured option for post-
petition creditors, however, since by definition the funds are required for 
unusual outlays and hence it would be prudent to obtain further security 
under section 364(c) or (d).30 
Post-petition secured credit is obtainable under section 364(c) or (d), 
following notice and a hearing, with the difference between these sections 
being that super-priority security can be taken only under section 364(d). 
There must be no possibility of obtaining finance allowable under section 
364(a) or (b) as an administrative expense, however.31 Thus section 364(c) 
creates three options for new creditors: 
 a claim ranking as the leading priority expense, before other 
administrative expenses. This would put the creditor first in line after 
the existing secured creditors; 
 a lien on otherwise unencumbered property of the debtor company. 
This would create a new security interest in assets which were not 
affected by pre-petition secured creditor claims; 
 a junior lien on already encumbered property. 
                                            
25  Section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
26  Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
27  Compare the arguments in Weintraub and Resnick Bankruptcy Law Manual 8-45 to 8-
46. 
28  Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 586. 
29  Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 586. 
30  Compare Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 586-587. 
31  Section 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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Henoch notes that most post-petition financing agreements in the USA 
operate under section 364(c).32 In order for this section to function, however, 
there must be value in the assets of the company over and above the 
existing claims of secured creditors. This is referred to as an "equity 
cushion" in the jurisprudence. It is the size of this equity cushion which is 
likely to induce a creditor to lend funds under section 364(c) without 
requiring super-priority.33 If the newly secured creditor is not first in the 
queue for payment, it would have to be demonstrated to its satisfaction that 
it is nevertheless guaranteed payment. 
Where there is insufficient equity to satisfy a post-petition creditor or no 
unencumbered assets to use as security, section 364(d) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that a court may authorise a granting of "super-priority" 
finance which takes precedence over existing pre-petition secured claims. 
Section 364(d) reads as follows: 
(d)(1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of 
credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on 
property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if –  
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and 
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the 
lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or 
equal lien is proposed to be granted. 
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of 
proof on the issue of adequate protection. 
As to leg A of section 364(d)(1), the case law suggests that the duty on the 
debtor to seek other forms of credit does not require it to approach every 
possible lender; the court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the 
test has been met. The US Court of Appeal for the fourth circuit held in In re 
Snowshoe Company Inc34 that it was sufficient for the debtor corporation to 
have approached financial institutions in the immediate geographical area.35 
This approach was echoed in In re Sky Valley Inc,36 where the corporation 
had identified potentially interested debtors as those holding a pre-petition 
security interest or doing business in the community surrounding the ski 
                                            
32  Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 587. 
33  Compare Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 588. 
34  In re Snowshoe Company Inc 789 F 2d 1085 (Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit 1986) 
(hereafter Snowshoe). 
35  Snowshoe 1088. 
36  In re Sky Valley Inc 100 BR 107 (Bankruptcy Court, Gainsville Division 1988) 
(hereafter Sky Valley). 
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resort and golf course business operated by the debtor company.37 All 
identified lenders had been unsuccessfully approached and this was held 
to be adequate.38 In In re Ames Department Stores Inc39 the size of the loan 
required to fund the reorganisation of the debtor ($250 million) was such 
that only a limited number of potential lenders was available.40 A denial of 
credit by four such lenders otherwise than under section 364(d) was 
therefore held sufficient to satisfy the requirements of that section.41 
As to leg B, the concept of "adequate protection" is defined in section 361. 
According to that section, adequate protection may be given by: 
 requiring the debtor company to make periodic cash payments to the 
affected creditor where the automatic stay on enforcement actions 
against the creditor under section 362 – or the granting of a super-
priority security interest under section 364 – has led to a decrease in 
the creditor's interest in the debtor's property. This would be 
particularly apt where a security interest is held in a depreciating 
asset and the automatic stay delays realisation of that interest; 
 providing an additional or replacement lien on alternative property; 
 providing alternative relief which will provide the creditor with the 
"indubitable equivalent" of its property. The US Supreme Court held 
in United Savings Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Associates Ltd42 that "indubitable equivalent" has developed a 
settled meaning "connoting the right of a secured creditor to receive 
present value of his security".43 
The rationale behind the concept of adequate protection is said to be the 
protection of property rights in the United States Constitution. It is also for 
this reason that super-priority is not as drastic a measure as it appears to 
be at first glance. In In re Swedeland Development Group Inc44 the Court of 
Appeal for the Third Circuit stated that the enquiry as to whether protection 
                                            
37  Sky Valley 113. 
38  Sky Valley 113. 
39  In re Ames Department Stores Inc 115 BR 34 (Bankruptcy Court, New York Division 
1990) (hereafter Ames). 
40  Ames 40. 
41  Ames 40. 
42  United Savings Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates Ltd 484 
US 365 (US Supreme Court 1988) (hereafter Timbers of Inwood). 
43  Timbers of Inwood 377. 
44  In re Swedeland Development Group Inc 16 F 3d 552 (Court of Appeal, Third Circuit 
1994) (hereafter Swedeland Development Group). 
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is adequate "depends directly on how effectively it compensates the 
secured creditor for loss of value caused by the super-priority given to the 
post-petition loan".45 An analysis of the case law indicates that this is the 
key determinative issue in a court's decision as to whether or not to grant 
finance. 
One of the enduring tests as to whether there is adequate protection for pre-
petition creditors is to determine if there is sufficient equity in the assets of 
the company to protect existing secured creditors from an issue of fresh 
super-priority finance.46 This is the "equity cushion" test. An example of a 
case decided on the basis of an equity cushion analysis is Sky Valley.47 In 
this case the debtor sought emergency super-priority funding in the amount 
of $400 000. The total outstanding debt on a golf course development 
owned by the debtor company was approximately $11 million. The value of 
the property hypothecated by the various security interests was about $12 
million. Thus the equity cushion was narrow. However, the only petitioning 
creditor (Anchor Bank) held a first priority security interest of about $3 million 
of the total debt, which was secured to property totalling $8,5 million dollars. 
Since the other creditors had not opposed the application for new section 
364(d) credit, the equity cushion of over $5 million was held alone to be 
sufficient protection to Anchor Bank, despite the fact that its claim would 
now be subordinated.48 
A similar finding was reached in In re Dunes Casino Hotel.49 Here the debtor 
sought $700 000 in super-priority funds to aid in the development of a casino 
hotel at Atlantic City. The objecting creditor was exposed to the extent of 
$17,6 million, a debt secured to property worth $26 million. Again, the court 
held that the equity cushion alone was sufficient protection.50 
In Snowshoe51 the court held that although some creditors viewed the equity 
cushion as part of the "bargained for consideration", the fact that liabilities 
of $13 million were recorded against a ski resort development worth $20 
million provided sufficient cushion for a super-priority loan of a further $2 
                                            
45  Swedeland Development Group 564. This passage was approved in the later cases 
of In re Campbell Sod Inc 378 BR 647 (Bankruptcy Court, Kansas Division 2007) 653 
and In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings LLC 434 BR 716 (District Court, Miami 
Florida Division 2010) (hereafter Fontainebleau) 749. 
46  Telesca 1988 Bankr Dev J 117-128. 
47  In re Sky Valley Inc 100 BR 107 (Bankruptcy Court, Gainsville Division 1988). 
48  Sky Valley 114. 
49  In re Dunes Casino Hotel 69 BR 784 (Bankruptcy Court, New Jersey Division 1986) 
(hereafter Dunes Casino Hotel). 
50  Dunes Casino Hotel 795. 
51  In re Snowshoe Company Inc 789 F 2d 1085 (Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit 1986). 
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million. This finding was based in part on the detailed financial projections 
of the debtor that the loan could be repaid in one ski season.52 These two 
factors together, held the court, amounted to adequate protection for the 
pre-petition creditor.53 
Snowshoe was one of the earlier cases dealing with a section 364(d) 
application and the finding that more than an equity cushion alone was 
needed could in part be ascribed to the criticism of the equity cushion 
analysis in In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.54 In that case it was held that while 
the equity cushion analysis was easy to apply, a court needed to be able to 
take into account the individual facts of a case.55 The court thus expressly 
rejected the concept of an equity cushion as a measure of whether there 
was adequate protection to creditors.56 This finding was based on the view: 
 that equity cushion analysis was inconsistent with the concept of 
adequate protection expressed in section 361, which was to guard 
against impairment of the lien; 
 that the purpose of section 361 was to compensate for lost value due 
to the automatic stay. (Consider for example the payment of cash 
compensation to creditors who are barred from enforcing their 
claims.) The value from other assets might be appropriated to pay 
such compensation, rather than secure fresh debt; 
 that equity should be used to rehabilitate debtors for the benefit of 
pre-petition creditors, not create new debt.57 
The finding in Alyucan seems to have made waves in the case law and in 
the secondary sources. The points raised against equity cushion analysis 
are valid, but seem to present a conservative view in favour of pre-petition 
secured creditors at the expense of the debtor corporation. This view seems 
at odds with the rest of the body of case law. In defence of Alyucan, Telesca 
notes that the structuring of ordinary credit agreements takes into account 
available security and attendant risk and this calculation of risk ultimately 
determines the bargain struck between the parties.58 To uproot security 
                                            
52  Snowshoe 1089. 
53  Snowshoe 1090. 
54  In re Alyucan Interstate Corp 12 Bankr 803 (Bankruptcy Court, Utah Division 1981) 
(Bankruptcy Court, Utah Division 1981) (hereafter Alyucan). Alyucan is cited in 
Snowshoe 1090. 
55  Alyucan 810. 
56  Alyucan 810-812. 
57  Alyucan 810-812. 
58  Telesca 1988 Bankr Dev J 129 (paraphrased). 
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post-petition on the basis of an equity cushion, he argues, is "to change one 
side of the terms without commensurately changing the other".59 Telesca 
concludes that it would be "beneficial to all parties" if the courts adopted "a 
cautious and calculated approach to the particulars of each case".60 
This cautiousness is recognised in the Snowshoe judgment as set out 
above. Further criticism of equity cushion analysis was presented in In re 
Aqua Associates,61 where the court raised the issue of whether the going 
concern or liquidated valuation of the property was more appropriate, as 
well the problems in conflicting valuations from two teams of lawyers and 
experts.62 Furthermore such analysis could either "foolishly let the air out of 
an equity cushion" or deny permission to a debtor who lacks an equity 
cushion to enter a transaction which is "demonstrably wise and 
resourceful".63 The court held that the presence of an equity cushion should 
merely be a factor in the decision and the inquiry should focus on whether 
the protection of the secured creditor's interest was adequate (citing inter 
alia Alyucan).64 In Aqua Associates the equity cushion was modest, but it 
had a potentially viable business plan involving a lucrative lease of its 
premises to an upmarket billiards club. The debtor was permitted to access 
super-priority funding.65 
Thus the case law reflects a certain amount of ambivalence between debtor 
and creditor interests, but the overall impression one gets is that 
reorganisation is viewed favourably by the courts. To this end an application 
for post-petition finance has a good prospect of success, provided the 
debtor can show the existence of an equity cushion and something more – 
such as the potential viability of its future business plans. In some cases an 
equity cushion alone will be sufficient, but this will depend on the individual 
facts of a given case. 
A final point to consider before leaving the discussion of section 364 is the 
impact of section 364(e). (Section 364(f) contains certain definitional limits 
on the concept of "security" for the purposes of the rest of the section which 
are not relevant to this paper.) Section 364(e) protects the good faith 
creditor under this section: its loan agreement (including possible super-
                                            
59  Telesca 1988 Bankr Dev J 129. 
60  Telesca 1988 Bankr Dev J 129. 
61  In re Aqua Associates 123 BR 192 (Bankruptcy Court, Pennsylvania Division 1991) 
(hereafter Aqua Associates). 
62  Aqua Associates 196. 
63  Aqua Associates 196. 
64  Aqua Associates 196. 
65  Aqua Associates 199. 
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priority) cannot be undone by a subsequent appeal of another creditor. This 
means that once credit has been approved the decision cannot be reversed 
(unless the final granting of the application had been stayed pending an 
appeal). For this reason many creditors face the issue of mootness in 
contesting an award of section 364 funding on appeal.66 Thus necessary 
protection is given to creditors and there is no danger of priority being denied 
ex post facto. This also means that if a creditor intends to appeal a 
successful section 364 application by the debtor, it must obtain a stay of the 
order pending appeal. 
Section 364 can thus be seen to be a carefully crafted section which 
balances the competing rights and interests of debtors and creditors and 
ensures viable access to funding. Debtors are supported by the incentivising 
of post-petition funding and creditors are protected by the requirement of 
adequate protection. There is also a very necessary procedural mechanism 
to avoid reversal of a section 364 order after money has already been lent. 
2.3 Cross-collateralisation 
One of the challenges facing post-petition financing in the US is what to do 
about the problem of cross-collateralisation. This is a means by which a pre-
petition creditor of the debtor secures its pre- and post-petition loan to the 
company in Chapter 11 proceedings, using section 364 preference to better 
its position in the ranking of creditors. The creditor (who is typically 
unsecured or under-secured with regard to its pre-petition debt) would thus 
advance further post-petition funds to the debtor company requiring a 
security interest over all the pre- and post-petition property of that debtor. 
The catch is that this new security interest would be required to cover the 
pre-petition debt as well. Thus the fresh finances are secured, typically with 
super-priority status – and the old finances are given a boost in the ranking 
of creditors to the same super-priority status. 
This type of financing was held to be not authorised by section 364 and to 
be against the basic priority structure of the code by the Court of Appeal for 
the Eleventh Circuit in In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co Inc.67 This finding 
was in concordance with the earlier ruling of the Court of Appeal for the 
Second Circuit in In re Texlon,68 which strongly disapproved of cross-
collateralisation, but left open the question as to whether it would be 
                                            
66  Compare for example Fontainebleau. 
67  In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co Inc 963 F 2d 1490 (Court of Appeal, Eleventh Circuit 
1992) 1496. 
68  In re Texlon 596 F 2d 1092 (Court of Appeal, Second Circuit 1979) 1098. 
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disqualified in every conceivable circumstance. The arguments against this 
practice are set out by Tabb: 
 section 364 is supposed to set out the exclusive list of permissible 
means of financing debtors – cross-collateralisation is not one of 
them; 
 the argument that permitting cross-collateralisation induces creditors 
to lend money should not be allowed to sway courts into allowing this 
practice since it is contrary to the principle of equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors upon bankruptcy; 
 without the protection of Chapter 11, the advantage given to pre-
petition debt would constitute a voidable preference; 
 considerations of equity were against this practice – the fact that it 
was fairly common put debtors in the difficult position of choosing 
between cross-collateralisation and liquidation. This would not occur 
if the practice were outlawed.69 
Despite the disapproval of two branches of the Court of Appeal, McCormack 
notes that many courts still approve this type of financing order.70 In re 
Vanguard Diversified Inc71 sets out a four-part test which the debtor must 
satisfy in order for a court to approve cross-collateralisation: 
 the business operations of the debtor will not survive without the 
proposed financing; 
 no alternative finance can be obtained on acceptable terms; 
 the proposed lender will not agree to provide finance without cross-
collateralisation; 
 the proposed financing is in the best interests of the creditor body as 
a whole.72 
In Vanguard Diversified cross-collateralisation was permitted by the court.73 
Indeed at the time of his writing (1986) Tabb noted that cross-
                                            
69  Tabb 1986 S Cal L Rev 119-175. 
70  McCormack Corporate Rescue Law 191. 
71  In re Vanguard Diversified Inc 31 BR 364 (Bankruptcy Court, New York Division 1983) 
(hereafter Vanguard Diversified). 
72  Vanguard Diversified 366. 
73  Vanguard Diversified 367. 
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collateralisation was becoming a standard term for sophisticated post-
petition lenders.74 
2.4 The position of employees with regard to post-petition finance 
The US is known for the lack of unionisation of many sectors of its labour 
force and the relatively weak position in which US labour law leaves 
employees.75 The same is largely true of the treatment of employees under 
the Bankruptcy Code. Hence employee contracts are "executory contracts" 
for the purposes of section 365, which means that the debtor company is 
free to terminate these employment contracts at will.76 Redundant 
employees are given a preferential claim against the company under section 
507(a)(4)(A) for wages accruing from up to 180 days prior to Chapter 11 
proceedings, but this is limited to $10 000. Thus it is safe to say that 
reorganisation often occurs at the expense of the company's workforce and 
that US law does not protect the plight of redundant employees to any great 
degree. 
The position of workers whose services the company wants to retain is 
different, however. The company typically extends special treatment to this 
group in an effort to maintain their loyalty – to the extent that there is a name 
for this practice – the "Key Employee Retention Plan".77 The special 
treatment typically involves bonuses and other pay-to-stay arrangements.78 
Thus fresh finance is a very necessary part in maintaining the viability of the 
company through the retention of essential workers. This is indeed one of 
the key uses of section 364 finance79 and the use of this money in this way 
needs to be authorised as an expense under section 363.80 Retained 
employees are thus one of the key beneficiaries of post-petition finance, but 
they certainly do not have any sort of claim on this money outside of the 
company's good will. Post-petition creditors would definitely have the first 
bite of the pie should the company go into liquidation, and employees would 
merely have a preferential claim under section 507. 
                                            
74  Tabb 1986 S Cal L Rev 168. 
75  McCormack Corporate Rescue Law 210-214. 
76  Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
77  Skeel 2004 Wash U LQ 1470. 
78  Skeel 2004 Wash U LQ 1473-1476. 
79  Compare Henoch 1991 Bankr Dev J 576; UNICTRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law (2004) para 94. 
80  If salaries are paid "in the ordinary course of business" court approval is not required 
under s 363(c). Skeel 2004 Wash U LQ 1475 states that court approval is required for 
KERPs, since these are not in the ordinary course of business, and hence s 363(b) 
pertains. 
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2.5 Criticism of Chapter 11 
This discussion would not be complete without pointing out that Chapter 11 
is facing increased scrutiny within the United States itself. As Wessels81 
notes, it is ironic that while many other countries regard Chapter 11 as a 
"holy grail", this statutory mechanism is not without criticism at home in the 
United States. In fact one of the main concerns surrounding the provisions 
of Chapter 11 is the manner in which it deals with the issue of secured credit. 
Walters summarises the main objection as follows: 
The narrative is now well established and oft-repeated. Whereas in the past, 
firms filing for chapter 11 would come into the bankruptcy process with at least 
some unencumbered assets, modern firms tend to have capital structures that 
are entirely consumed by multiple layers of secured debt. And so, according 
to the prevailing conventional wisdom, chapter 11, in the general run of cases, 
has become little more than a glorified nationwide foreclosure process through 
which secured creditors can exit via a quick section 363 sale or an outright 
liquidation.82 
In other words, current experience in the United States points to the fact that 
secured creditors are diverting bankrupt companies away from the Chapter 
11 process entirely. 83 This criticism suggests that some view Chapter 11 
simply as an additional foreclosure process, or a debtor-centred form of 
"unsupervised winding up".84 
3 Post-commencement finance in South Africa 
3.1 Sections 134 and 135 of the Companies Act, 2008 
Section 135 of the Act appears in part A ("business rescue proceedings") of 
Chapter 6, which deals inter alia with various preliminary matters such as 
entry into business rescue,85 the moratorium on proceedings against a 
company,86 the protection of property interests87 and the effect of business 
                                            
81  Wessels 2014 Insolvency Intelligence 5. See further: Bradley and Rosenzweig 1992 
Yale LJ 1043; Kirshner 2015 U Penn J Bus L 527. 
82  Walters 2015 U Ill L Rev 545. Also see ABI Symposium 2010 Am Bankr Inst L Rev; 
Tabb 2013 U Ill L Rev 103; Tabb 2015 U Ill L Rev 765. 
83  Kirshner 2015 U Penn J Bus L 527 points out that "Increasingly, secured creditors 
divert bankrupt companies from the traditional Chapter 11 process, which has 
protected the interests of junior creditors, and push them instead into asset sales 
under Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code". 
84  This phrase is borrowed from Rajak and Henning 1999 SALJ 267, who cite the view 
of Olver Judicial Management 9. This quote in the original refers to the system of 
judicial management under the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926. We have 
appropriated it here for our purposes. 
85  Sections 129-131 of the Act. 
86  Section 133 of the Act. 
87  Section 134 of the Act. 
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rescue on contracts,88 employees,89 shareholders and directors.90 Part A 
thus deals with certain immediate consequences of business rescue and 
the inclusion of post-commencement finance in this preliminary section 
reflects the fact that an injection of fresh capital is likely to be one of the first 
requirements of a distressed company. 
Before considering the substance of section 135, section 134(3) bears 
mention, as its provisions impact on the position of the existing secured 
creditor. The section determines that the distressed company may not, 
during business rescue proceedings, dispose of any property over which 
another person has any security or title interest unless certain requirements 
have been complied with. In short, the company will require the prior 
consent of the affected person, unless the disposal would be sufficient to 
discharge the indebtedness protected by the affected person's security or 
title interest, in which case payment out of sale proceeds should promptly 
be made.91 
Obtaining fresh finance as such is dealt with in section 135(2): 
During its business rescue proceedings, the company may obtain financing … 
and any such financing may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of 
the company to the extent that it is not otherwise encumbered ….92 
A plausible literal reading of this provision would suggest that pre-existing 
security is not subordinated to new secured lenders. Hence the new finance 
may be secured only with existing equity in the company's assets or with 
assets not already subject to a security interest. Post-commencement 
secured creditors will seemingly rank ahead of unsecured creditors in the 
order in which such claims are incurred. The immediate question which 
arises is what if there are no equity or unencumbered assets available to 
the company in question? Particularly if such a company is indeed in 
financial distress, it is likely that it will already have pursued all available 
credit options and have no assets left to secure fresh finance.93 The 
legislation quite simply does not make adequate provision for this scenario. 
Indeed, the legislative approach taken here stands in stark contrast to that 
taken by Chapter 11, which, as discussed, offers nuanced mechanisms to 
                                            
88  Section 136 of the Act. 
89  Section 136 of the Act. 
90  Section 137 of the Act. 
91  Section 134(3) of the Act.. 
92  Section 135(2) of the Act (emphasis added). 
93  That this is the case was confirmed by a recent report prepared on behalf of the CIPC: 
Pretorius 2015 http://www.cipc.co.za/files/4714/2866/7900/Report_Number_3_ 
ammended_30032015.pdf. 
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address the likely factual scenario that no equity or unencumbered assets 
remain available. 
The Act also fails to create incentives to attract fresh finance in its ranking 
of company creditors. This ranking is established by section 135(3) and 
represents a variation on what would be the conventional liquidation ranking 
of creditors. The following order of claims is laid down: 
 the remuneration of the business rescue practitioner and costs of 
business rescue proceedings; 
 "remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other amount of 
money relating to employment" which becomes due and payable by 
the company to its employees during business rescue; 
 secured creditors (including pre-commencement secured creditors), 
ranked according to the items of property over which the security 
interest is held and the order in which such security rights were 
obtained; 
 unsecured post-commencement creditors; and 
 unsecured pre-commencement creditors. 
Section 135(4) holds that this ranking will be maintained if the company 
should subsequently slide into liquidation (with allowance for the costs of 
liquidation, of course). 
There can hardly be a quibble about prioritising the business rescue 
practitioner's costs. If there is to be a displacement of a company's 
management this should be undertaken by a highly competent person and 
without guarantees of payment this would be difficult to effect. The ranking 
of employees' claims in second place is ostensibly in line with the Act's 
general approach, which is more stakeholder friendly. The provisions of 
section 135(1) seem broad enough to cover wages, reimbursement for 
expenses, and contributions by the employer to the employees' pension 
funds. It should be noted, however, that this priority applies only to 
employment costs incurred during business rescue proceedings. Pre-
commencement employee claims are dealt with separately.94 This 
represents a laudable attempt to ensure that employees are protected, and 
stands in stark contrast to the harsh American position discussed above. 
                                            
94  Section 136 of the Act. 
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Employees play a pivotal role in ensuring a successful rescue of the 
business. This stakeholder-inclusive approach also aligns with the 
increasingly stakeholder friendly perspectives ingrained in the modern 
approach to corporate governance.95 
3.2 Overview of recent decisions by the courts 
In Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced 
Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd,96 Kgomo J had the 
opportunity to consider the ranking of creditors under section 135. The court 
concluded that this section should be interpreted to mean that claims rank 
in the following order of preference: first, remuneration and expenses of the 
practitioner and other persons (including legal and other professionals) for 
the costs of the business rescue proceedings. Secondly, remuneration for 
employees that became due and payable post-commencement. Thirdly, the 
claims of secured lenders for loans or supply made after business rescue 
commenced (so-called "post-commencement creditors"). Fourthly, 
unsecured post-commencement creditors; with pre-commencement 
secured creditors ranked fifth. In sixth place are the remuneration claims of 
employees, which predate the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings. Lastly, seventh, are unsecured pre-commencement 
creditors.97 Kgomo J reiterated this interpretation in Redpath Mining South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden.98 
It is questionable whether this interpretation of the Act is sound. The 
judgment does not expressly consider the wording of the provision, nor the 
impact of the chosen interpretation, and in fact does not cite the legislation 
directly but instead relies exclusively on a single secondary source.99 There 
might be some contention about whether or not secured post-
commencement creditors might outrank pre-commencement secured 
creditors, but it is highly questionable whether the wording of the Act 
envisages that unsecured post-commencement creditors should also do so. 
                                            
95  See for example IODSA King III 9. 
96  Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and 
Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd 2013 ZAGPJHC 109 (10 May 2013) (hereafter 
Merchant West). 
97  Merchant West para 21. 
98  Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden 2013 ZAGPJHC 148 (14 June 2013) 
(hereafter Redpath) para 54. 
99  Merchant West para 21, where Kgomo J refers to Stein and Everingham New 
Companies Act 420-421. 
H STOOP AND A HUTCHISON  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  19 
The constitutional era has seen a break with South Africa's literalist past 
when it comes to statutory interpretation.100 The Constitutional Court has 
often discussed statutory interpretation, stressing a contextual, purposive 
approach, which interprets a statute through the "prism of the Bill of 
Rights".101 Even in the dry world of commercial law, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has confirmed that the proper approach to statutory (and other 
textual) interpretation is a purposive one, which examines context from the 
outset, without needing the open sesame of ambiguity or absurdity.102 Wallis 
JA held as follows in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund: 
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, 
having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or 
provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence.103 
Wallis JA went on to explain that this approach requires an interpreter to 
consider the language used in a provision in the light of the ordinary rules 
of grammar and syntax, and to balance this with the apparent purpose of a 
provision and its context, which includes the material known to those who 
drafted it.104 This process is objective, not subjective, requiring an 
investigation into the meaning of the words actually used.105 A court should 
also prefer a meaning which makes business common sense, in line with 
purposive construction.106 Finally, judges should be careful not to diverge 
from interpretation into legislation: any meaning derived from a text must be 
grounded in the language thereof.107 
It is not clear how Kgomo J's interpretation of the post-commencement 
finance provisions accords with this approach. In spite of the fact that 
interpretation is now considered a unitary process,108 the literal meaning of 
the words must remain the starting point of any engagement with the text. 
                                            
100  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See generally 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd. In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 
(hereafter Hyundai) paras 21-26. 
101  Hyundai para 21. 
102  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 
(hereafter Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund) para 18. See further: Bothma-Batho 
Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 2 SA 494 
(SCA) (hereafter Bothma-Batho) paras 10-12; Wallis 2010 SALJ. 
103  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund para 18. 
104  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund para 18. 
105  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund para 18.  
106  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund para 18. 
107  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund para 18. 
108  Bothma-Batho para 12. 
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Certainly the ideal is a comprehensive approach based on the actual 
wording of the document, as opposed to one that takes only the context into 
account. Subsection 135(3) gives post-commencement creditors (whether 
secured or not) a ranking above that of "all unsecured claims against the 
company".109 The express inclusion of unsecured claims surely points by 
implication to the exclusion of secured claims in this instance.110 Such an 
interpretation also aligns with section 135(2), in terms of which assets may 
be utilised for the purposes of security post-commencement only to the 
extent that they are unencumbered. The interpretation taken by the court 
effectively undermines or renders obsolete the provisions of this subsection 
by negating the rights of the pre-commencement secured creditor almost 
entirely. Therefore the consequences of the interpretation will likely not pass 
constitutional muster as the argument could convincingly be made that such 
an interpretation of the legislation will deprive pre-commencement secured 
creditors of their property rights in an unconstitutional manner.111 
Delport further argues that the decision taken in Merchant West does not 
seem to be in accordance with section 135(3) because the subsection does 
not refer to secured claims before business rescue began, as these are 
regulated by section 134.112 The author points out that although the same 
ranking was also used in Redpath Mining the Court in that instance 
expressly referred to the rights of "secured" creditors as contained in section 
134(3).113 In the light of this it bears mention that section 134 deals with pre-
commencement secured creditors in instances where the company aims to 
dispose of an encumbered asset. It seems not to extend to instances where 
the company seeks to further encumber such an asset. As such it is 
submitted that section 135(3)(b) might well apply in addition to section 134 
to govern such instances. If so, it is lamentable that the Legislature does not 
expressly set out how this would affect the ranking. The fact that section 
135(2) allows for assets to be further encumbered only to the extent 
possible, and then determines that such creditors have a preference "in the 
order in which they were incurred",114 seems to suggest that what was 
envisaged was a ranking that preferred the secured pre-commencement 
                                            
109  Section 135(3)(b) of the Act. 
110  This is the so-called expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule. For a modern 
discussion, see Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 BCLR 1 
(CC) para 192. 
111  A comprehensive discussion of matters related to the constitutionality of the court's 
approach falls outside of the scope of this paper but would of course be based on the 
rights contained in s 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
112  Delport "Post-commencement Finance" 480(42). 
113  Delport "Post-commencement Finance" 480(42). 
114  Section 135(3)(b) of the Act. 
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creditor, followed by secured post-commencement creditors in the order in 
which their claims were incurred. This interpretation has the added benefit 
of giving meaning to the provisions of subsection 135(2). 
Pretorius and Du Preez observe that the rankings as set out in the Act prefer 
the post-commencement secured creditor, but the authors subsequently 
support the interpretation of the court in Merchant West as "an encouraging 
development for the distressed investing industry".115 The authors do not 
engage with the logic of the court and it is not clear how their argument can 
be justified. To be sure, mechanisms to support the distressed investing 
industry (to use the authors' term) should be forthcoming and, as argued 
above, the legislation in its current form seems to be inadequate. However, 
as will be argued in the conclusion below, the solution does not lie in 
disregarding the clear wording of the Act in favour of an interpretation that 
ostensibly addresses the concerns created by the Legislature's apparent 
omissions. It is especially ill conceived to attempt to incorporate 
mechanisms which are accompanied by extensive judicial oversight 
elsewhere without also including the necessary safeguards and scrutiny. In 
spite of the controversy, it seems as though the observations related to the 
ranking of creditors in both of Kgomo J's decisions above remain obiter dicta 
and will hence not bind future courts.116 
Post-commencement finance was also considered in the matter of 
Kritzinger v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.117 In Kritzinger the applicant 
company, which was in the business of providing mining supplies, found 
itself in financial distress. It had been a client of the respondent bank for the 
preceding nine years, and held two accounts with it – one an overdraft 
facility with a R800 000 limit, the other a salary account used to pay 
employees and for certain other business expenses.118 Nine years before 
the events in question the applicant company had ceded book debts to the 
respondent bank.119 After being notified of the initiation of business rescue 
proceedings, the bank set off funds in the salary account against the deficit 
in the overdraft facility and demanded that the book debts be paid directly 
                                            
115  Pretorius and Du Preez 2013 SA J Entrep & Small Bus Man 171. This article offers a 
comprehensive analysis of the state of post-commencement finance in South Africa. 
116  Kgomo J's observations regarding the ranking of creditors form part of a general 
overview of the consequences of business rescue and do not form part of the ultimate 
decision. See Merchant West para 52; Redpath paras 29-39. 
117  Kritzinger v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2013 ZAFSHC 215 (19 September 
2013) (hereafter Kritzinger). 
118  Kritzinger para 10. 
119  Kritzinger para 23. 
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to it.120 Upon receiving this instruction, the business rescue practitioner 
opened an account with another financial services provider (Investec) and 
started receiving book debts in the new account.121 The overdraft 
agreement with Standard Bank contained a clause that entitled that bank to 
revoke this facility at any time, should the financial position of the applicant 
deteriorate.122 In the light of this provision, Rampai AJP concluded that the 
actions of the respondent bank had been justified.123 By notifying the bank 
of the commencement of business rescue proceedings the company itself 
admitted financial distress, and the bank as final arbitrator had the sole and 
final discretion to determine that the financial position of the applicant had 
deteriorated and to cancel the overdraft agreement.124 
The court confirmed that the respondent bank had merely exercised its 
contractual powers in a lawful and acceptable manner in terms of the 
recognised hierarchy of creditors. In this regard the court made the following 
noteworthy observation: 
The respondent is still a secured creditor post commencement of business 
rescue proceedings in much the same way as it was prior to the 
commencement of such proceedings. The commencement of such 
proceedings did not and could not demote the respondent from its rightful 
position as a creditor with a secured rank.125 
These sentiments seem to contradict in strong terms the conclusion 
reached by the court in the Merchant West and Redpath decisions and 
instead align with the protection afforded to secured creditors under section 
134 of the Act (as set out above). The court came to the conclusion that the 
provisions of section 133(1) of the Act (on which the applicant had relied) 
did not preclude the bank from applying set-off, given the facts of the case. 
Rampai AJP argued further that even if this were not the case, it would be 
inequitable to order the respondent bank to reverse the set-off transaction 
in the light of the facts both that its security had been "drastically diminished 
if not completely eroded", and that such a reversal would release the 
affected funds to the parties whose "subversive conduct" had rendered the 
applicant's security for repayment of the overdraft facilities meaningless.126 
In the words of the judge, "this the law could not countermine".127 In relation 
                                            
120  Kritzinger para 17. 
121  Kritzinger para 20. 
122  Kritzinger para 32. 
123  Kritzinger para 47. 
124  Kritzinger para 47. 
125  Kritzinger para 54. 
126  Kritzinger para 77. 
127  Kritzinger para 77. 
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to the payment of the book debts into the new Investec account, the court 
found that the first applicant (the business rescue practitioner) had 
contravened s 134(3), which protects the rights of the secured pre-
commencement creditor.128 
3.3 Cross-collateralisation under section 135? 
If there is a lack of incentive for creditors to invest in reorganising companies 
in South Africa, perhaps some sort of cross-collateralisation goal could 
motivate a lender to further secure its position with regard to a company's 
assets. Cross-collateralisation (as stated above) is when post-
commencement finance is granted to a debtor on the agreement that this 
will constitute a secured loan, with the security extending to the pre-
commencement debt as well. This could be achieved in South Africa by 
taking security in all unencumbered property of the debtor to the extent that 
such property exceeds the value of the post-commencement loan. Would 
this practice be permitted under the new business rescue laws? The 
wording of section 135(2) does not condone or disallow this practice, 
speaking only of security for present financing ("any such financing may be 
secured to the lender" – see the discussion in part 3.1 above). Ultimately, 
this is a policy-laden question for a court interpreting the provision to 
determine. 
4 Analysis 
4.1  The Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Kariba 
The decision in Kariba centered on an interpretation of the term "binding 
offer" found in section 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act and thus does not directly 
pertain to the issue of post-commencement financing.129 The court was 
specifically called on to determine whether a "binding offer" made in terms 
of the section implied a mandatory acceptance of such an offer by the 
offeree.130 The court a quo had concluded that such an offer should indeed 
be considered binding in this way and based its decision on what was 
considered a similar procedure contained in Chapter 11.131 The relevance 
                                            
128  Kritzinger para 51. 
129  Section 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that (if a business rescue plan has been 
rejected) "any affected person, or combination of affected persons, may make a 
binding offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more persons who opposed 
the adoption of the business rescue plan, at a value independently and expertly 
determined, on the request of the practitioner, to be a fair and reasonable estimate of 
the return to that person, or those persons, if the company were to be liquidated". 
130  Kariba paras 12-21. 
131  Kariba para 8. 
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of the decision for our present purposes, however, lies in the Supreme Court 
of Appeal's observations on the appropriateness of using the Chapter 11 
procedure as an interpretative guide to the particular section of the Act in 
question. In this regard, Dambuza AJA points out that: 
[C]ertain factors distinguish the process as provided for in our Act from the 
procedure provided for in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. First, under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code it is the court that makes the decision as to whether rejection 
of a business plan by a creditor should be ignored. Obviously that decision 
would be taken after due consideration of all relevant factors. In s 1129(a) of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code the requirements that must be satisfied before a 
court can confirm a rescue plan are listed. And the provisions of this section 
are peremptory.132 
The accepted meaning of term "offer" as it has developed in South African 
jurisprudence was also analysed and the court concluded that the 
Legislature intended for the offer in question to be binding on the offeror (an 
interpretation which aligns with the position at common law).133 No further 
mention was made of Chapter 11 or its worth as persuasive authority when 
interpreting the Act. The SCA did, however, highlight the untenable practical 
consequences of an interpretation that aligned with Chapter 11 as argued 
for by counsel for the respondent debtor company.134 These practical 
examples make it abundantly clear that such a construal effectively plucks 
a provision from United States law in a vacuum – leaving behind the 
contextual safeguards, such as oversight mechanisms, that anchor and give 
meaning to its terms. It is thus not only in interpreting legislation, but also in 
drafting it, that one runs the risk of disregarding such context when 
transplanting legal provisions from elsewhere. 
4.2 Legal transplants135 
Legal transplantation136 is almost as old as the law itself.137 However, in a 
modern and globalised society many countries are subsuming the laws of 
other jurisdictions at an ever-increasing pace – a trend motivated by 
                                            
132  Kariba para 16. 
133  Kariba paras 17-19. 
134  Kariba paras 22-24. 
135  There is a vast literature dedicated to the phenomenon of legal transplants. See for 
example Watson Legal Transplants; Kahn-Freund 1974 MLR; Legrand 1997 MJECL; 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 2003 Am J Comp L; Miller 2003 Am J Comp L; Markovits 
2005 Cornell Int'l LJ; Graziadei 2009 Theo Inq L. 
136  Watson Legal Transplants 21 defines legal transplantation as "the moving of a rule or 
a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another". 
137  Miller 2003 Am J Comp L 839. Miller gives the (17th century BC) Code of Hammurabi 
as one of the oldest examples.  
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necessity, political pressure,138 expediency or otherwise.139 Miller140 rightly 
points out: 
Whether it is in order to assimilate or diverge from the value and necessity of 
legal transplants and the concomitant need to take heed of jurisprudence 
developed in other jurisdictions when interpreting alien precepts can hardly be 
called into question. 
Most countries will find themselves unable to attract international investment 
or engage in international trade without at least to some extent aligning their 
legislation with international norms and best practices.141 Scholars are in 
two camps where legal transplants are concerned. 
On the one hand, proponents of legal transplant theory (for example, and 
most famously, Watson) argue that there are few social challenges to lifting 
rules or systems of law from one jurisdiction to the next.142 This is due to the 
fact that the law is considered socially neutral and can be divorced from 
socio-economic, political and historical context.143 Of greater significance, it 
could be argued, would be the legal tradition from which the rule stems and 
this should be taken into account when considering the likelihood of a 
successful transplant.144 The transplant theory was explained and 
advanced by Cotterrell, and drew distinctions between law that is culturally 
based and law that is instrumental.145 As such, areas such as family law and 
the law of succession are considered culturally based, and will be more 
susceptible to influences of cultural and social context, whereas corporate 
law is in general considered instrumental and therefore more neutral and 
better suited to becoming the subject of a transplant.146 Corporate law, 
Cotterrell argues, relies on "economic interests rather than national customs 
or sentiments" and therefore it is less likely that new rules or systems will 
be rejected following the transplant.147 
On the other hand, contextualist theory opposes this notion. As Kahn-
Freund148 points out: 
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[A]ny attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its original 
country entails a risk of rejection ... [and] its use requires a knowledge not only 
of the foreign law but also of its social and above all political contexts. 
Similarly culturalist theory completely rejects the idea that legal transplants 
are at all possible. In the words of Legrand, "[i]n any meaningful sense of 
the term, 'legal transplants'… cannot happen".149 This is because of the fact 
that any rule which is assimilated is in fact also culturally appropriated to the 
extent that it becomes inappropriate to refer to it as a transplant at all.150 
A middle road may exist between these camps: Friedman argues that it is 
modernity itself that makes it possible for vastly dissimilar systems to 
assimilate, due to the fact that developing economies will increasingly face 
the same challenges that developed countries have been grappling with for 
years, thus prompting a need for legal transplants to occur.151 
Further analysis of the phenomenon of legal transplants beyond this brief 
introduction falls outside of the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that 
transplants remain a reality in modern legal discourse and that it is an 
undeniable fact that jurisdictions the world over, and particularly in the 
developing world, are increasingly driven to conform their systems of law 
under international pressure to what is considered best practice.152 
Corporate legislation anecdotally has the most to gain from such alignments 
and indeed ensuring that our legislation remains in step with international 
developments was one of the drivers behind the draft 2008 legislative 
reforms.153 In addition to the usual caveats that apply when transplanting 
law, Loubser points to a number of reasons why, popular as it may be, 
Chapter 11 could be a Trojan horse as far as the law of insolvency and 
corporate reorganisation is concerned:154 
An insolvency system should arise out of existing cultural conditions and 
attitudes, and how debt is viewed in a specific country. Transplanted 
insolvency laws do not reflect these views and are then expected to change 
the cultural attitude to debt and debt forgiveness, something they cannot do, 
and so these imported systems are often ineffective.155 
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There is academic argument to the effect that Americans view insolvency 
with a spirit of optimism that other countries do not share. Such scholars 
would hold that being declared insolvent does not bring with it the usual 
stigma and judgements, and that the rehabilitation of the debtor to his 
erstwhile state of being a contributing consumer has high priority.156 As 
Martin157 points out: 
The United States never adopted the English's unforgiving and highly 
administrative bankruptcy process… The focus in the United States instead was 
on balancing the desires of creditor groups and debtor groups, and promoting 
commerce. To this day, a United States bankruptcy debtor's freedom of choice 
about whether to liquidate or reorganize remains a key component of United 
States bankruptcy law… While in most parts of the world business failure 
causes less stigma than personal financial failure, both forms are viewed far 
more negatively in England, Australia, and Canada than in the United States. 
The fact that this societal norm extends to corporate reorganisation is 
evidenced by the eager participation of financial service providers 
incentivised to invest in financially distressed firms. Indeed McCormack 
goes so far as to describe the United States' DIP financing regime as a 
"prime candidate" for "banks looking for a low-risk, high yield venture".158 
Chemical Bank, for example, a United States company which established a 
specialist DIP unit in 1984, claimed after a considerable lapse of time that it 
had "never lost a penny" in this type of venture.159 In addition, in the United 
States a number of debtor-centred features of insolvency and bankruptcy 
laws "are structured to correct slack and improve managerial decision 
making" and are in fact thus considered by some to be "last-resort 
governance mechanisms".160 This is not the position in South Africa, which 
has traditionally taken a creditor-friendly stance and where, if anything, a 
debtor-centred approach is viewed with scepticism.161 
4.3  Further observations  
The inclusion of a post-commencement financing provision in the new South 
African Companies Act is a necessary step in favour of successful 
reorganisation. Finance is essential to pay employees, maintain supplies of 
goods and services, and provide for the miscellaneous overhead costs 
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necessary for the business to continue as a functioning entity.162 It is not 
difficult to establish that there is a demand for post-commencement finance, 
but what are the incentives for lenders? Clearly it is potentially risky to lend 
to a corporation which is by definition in financial distress and hence the 
legislative safeguards which must be put in place to protect new and existing 
creditors. In the United States incentives for new lending are created by 
priority over pre-petition unsecured creditors or even by super-priority over 
pre-petition secured creditors under section 364(d). At the same time, 
section 364 ensures that pre-petition creditors are adequately protected. 
While the ranking of creditors might be altered, courts are careful not to 
undermine the legitimate interests of pre-petition secured creditors. This 
protection is said to stem from a constitutional protection of property 
rights.163 
Similar considerations appear to have moved the South African Legislature, 
so that security for post-commencement finance may be granted only to the 
extent that assets "are not otherwise encumbered".164 Section 135 of the 
Act is much simpler and far less flexible than its United States counterpart, 
however. In particular, the failure to allow for any form of super-priority for 
post-commencement secured creditors suggests that the South African 
Legislature has omitted the crucial feature of a loan incentive to prospective 
creditors particularly in instances where a distressed debtor has no 
unencumbered assets left. The United States requirement of adequate 
protection and the strict enforcement thereof in the courts shows that super-
priority need not spell the end for pre-commencement creditors. The 
consequences of the decisions in Redpath and Merchant West is that this 
interpretation in effect now allows for a super-priority to be afforded to a 
post-commencement creditor without any of the protection and court 
oversight that accompanies this procedure in terms of Chapter 11. It also 
seems to be completely at odds with the provisions of section 134. Indeed, 
the pre-commencement secured creditor is left in a perilous position. 
Ironically this might well be a strategy that companies in business rescue 
could abuse, since this mechanism could be used to leverage a pre-
commencement creditor into providing further funds in order to allow that 
creditor to make use of cross-collateralisation to improve its position or 
merely to avoid being usurped by another creditor. 
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Five years have passed since the Act came into operation. It would seem 
there is already evidence indicating that one of the critical challenges facing 
companies under business rescue is the fact that post-commencement 
finance is not forthcoming in South Africa. In a report prepared on behalf of 
the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), Pretorius 
highlights concerns that have come to light.165 Pretorius166 points out that 
South Africa appears to have a very small venture capital market. 
Furthermore, he notes that: 
The perceived "low preference" that a PCF investor will hold in case of an 
eventual liquidation (if rescue fails) also contributes to the adversity to PCF 
provision. Related to the lack of data integrity, potential PCF providers 
perceive the risk as too high for the allocated preference. 
The report further confirms that, as is the case in the United States, most of 
an embattled company's assets are already encumbered by the time that 
the company files for business rescue and it would appear that alternative 
advanced financing options are under-utilised (the report refers specifically 
to mechanisms such as debt swaps or buying the bank's debt).167 In the 
light of the fact that business rescue practitioners consider it an unwritten 
rule that a lack of post-commencement finance means that there is there is 
little prospect of a successful rescue, a lack of comprehensive legislative 
regulation may well prove fatal.168 
5 Conclusion 
It is abundantly clear that in spite of a purported reliance by the South 
African Legislature on Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 
the distinctions between the Act's business rescue provisions and their 
American counterpart are stark – at least as far as post-commencement 
finance is concerned. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these distinctions is 
the lesser degree of court oversight in the South African process. As the 
decision in Kariba shows, this is the case for many of Chapter 6's provisions. 
The impact of this must not be underestimated and the courts should 
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proceed with great caution when drawing comparative conclusions from 
Chapter 11 and related American cases. 
This paper's proposed solution is not that the provisions of Chapter 11 
should be transplanted in their entirety through an amendment of the Act to 
align with its United States counterpart. The Chapter 11 procedure is not 
necessarily the most suitable solution for South Africa and in any event, 
recent reports would suggest that reorganization is a fallible process in both 
jurisdictions, and the United States is itself reconsidering various aspects of 
Chapter 11.169 One of the core problems that South Africa would face if it 
tried to more fully replicate the United States' post-commencement 
financing provisions is that these rely extensively on court oversight. In 
South Africa, by contrast, court oversight is shunned, due to the perception 
that undue court involvement will encumber business rescue proceedings, 
rendering it costly and time consuming.170 
There is some irony in this reasoning if one considers the myriad of factual 
variations that might present themselves in this type of scenario, as well as 
the number of stakeholders with conflicting interests and the nuanced 
manner in which such a matter must surely be managed in the interests of 
both commercial realities and legal certainty. The fact that the South African 
Legislature did not provide for a more rigorous and detailed regulatory 
regime with regard to post-commencement finance might actually represent 
as big a threat to corporate reorganisation as unwarranted court oversight. 
The current position might also have the unexpected consequence that 
court oversight occurs by default, when creditors without statutory recourse 
to this form of supervision are forced to turn to litigation in a situation where 
the lacunae in the Act are abused.171 
There may, however, be other options for oversight that could prove as 
effective as the United States' mechanism, while still minimising delay and 
legal costs. For example, it might be possible to give the Companies 
Tribunal jurisdiction to oversee applications by creditors for priority in 
instances where there are no unencumbered assets left, yet adequate 
protection of the interests of all remaining creditors can be established. For 
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factual examples where this might be appropriate, the reader is referred to 
the American cases discussed above in Part Two. The Act already makes 
provision for similar forms of extra-judicial oversight in other contexts such 
as the jurisdiction of the Takeover Regulations Panel to oversee so-called 
"affected transactions" involving "regulated companies".172 Similarly, it 
would be possible to regulate certain types of company more keenly than 
others. There are, of course, several other examples of this type of 
differentiation in the Act.173 In fact, in the context of Chapter 6 the regulations 
already make provision for a process of differentiation for the purposes of 
the appointment of the business rescue practitioner.174 This could be taken 
into account to address concerns that smaller entities might be affected 
more detrimentally by the costs of court oversight than larger ones. 
After analysing the existing jurisprudence related to Chapter 6, Osode175 
argues that the South African case law is beginning to demonstrate the 
"gaps in the framework" of our business rescue provisions, reflecting poor 
quality drafting. The fact that South African courts are faced with factual 
scenarios for which the Act makes no provision could lead to a forced 
interpretation of its provisions. The danger exists that an interpretation such 
as the one in Merchant West is favoured by later courts as a robust pro-
business rescue position. This type of reasoning equates more aggressive 
protection of post-commencement creditors with being pro-business 
rescue, whereas a more restrained approach is by default seen as being 
pro-liquidation and more creditor friendly. Theoretically more robust rescue 
incentives and adequate protection for post-commencement financiers will 
bolster business rescue efforts. Attempting to achieve this end by reading 
United States-type mechanisms into the provisions of the existing Act, as 
was done by the court a quo in Kariba, as well as in Merchant West and 
Redpath, would be misguided, however. In fact, such a trend could, without 
the necessary and concomitant foreign safeguards, paradoxically threaten 
the viability of business rescue in South Africa, given the fact that the 
success of these provisions relies to a great extent on the trust of 
stakeholders, especially creditors.176 
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Chapter 11 ostensibly favours reorganisation and the skepticism that the 
process is met with elsewhere is far less of a hindrance in the United 
States.177 While the South African Act supports reorganization by making 
provision for post-commencement financing (this is not true, for example, of 
the United Kingdom)178 the balance struck in section 135, the lack of 
nuance, and the complete lack of court oversight make it impossible to 
protect pre-commencement secured creditors while at the same time 
offering viable options to persuade post-commencement creditors to invest 
in a company in distress. This is certainly one of the areas of the Act that 
the Legislature should revisit to seek a creative and realistic solution. As this 
analysis has shown, interpretation by the courts will not be able to save the 
existing provisions that regulate post-commencement financing. 
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